233 
337 


CORRESPONDENCE   AND   REMARKS 


BANCROFT'S  HISTORY   OF   THE   NORTHERN 
OF   1777, 


TH! 


AND   THE   CHARACTER    OK 


MAJOR-GEN.   PHILIP    SCHUYLER 


GEORGE  L.    SCHUYLER. 


NEW   YORK: 
DAVID    G.    FRANCIS,    506    BROADWAY. 

1867. 


CORRESPONDENCE   ANT)   REMARKS 


BANCROFT'S  HISTORY  OF  THE   NORTHERN  CAMPAIGN 
OF   1777, 


AND  THE  CHARACTER  OF 


MAJOR-GEN.  PHILIP    SCHUYLER, 


BY 


GEORGE   L.    SCHUYLER 
M 


NEW   YORK: 
DAVID    G.     FRANCIS,     506    BROADWAY. 

1867. 


BRADSTREET  PRESS. 


REMARKS  AND  CORRESPONDENCE. 


THE  Northern  Campaign  of  1777,  from  the  import 
ance  of  its  results,  has  always  been  a  subject  of  great 
interest  to  the  student  of  American  history.  In  En 
gland  the  plan  of  it  was  devised  by  the  King,  Lord 
George  Germain  and  General  Burgoyne  ;  the  latter 
having  returned  to  England  from  Canada  the  preced 
ing  year.  Its  object  was  to  form  a  junction  between 
the  two  armies — that  in  Canada  and  that  under  Gen 
eral  Howe  in  New  York,  which  was  considered  "the 
speediest  mode  of  quelling  the  rebellion.'7 

The  army  was  composed  of  about  8000  men,  admira 
bly  appointed.  Burgoyne,  with  the  main  force,  was 
to  proceed  by  Lake  Champlain  ;  a  detachment  of 
regulars  under  St.  Leger,  and  of  Tories  and  Indians 
under  Sir  John  Johnson,  were  to  enter  the  Mohawk 
country,  draw  the  attention  of  General  Schuyler  in 
that  direction,  attack  Fort  Stanwix,  and,  having  rav 
aged  the  valley  of  the  Mohawk,  rejoin  Burgoyne  at 
Albany. 

1 

ivil60430 


It  was  not,  however,  until  late  in  June,  and  after 
General  Burgoyne  had  actually  started  .upon  his  expe 
dition,  that  General  Washington  was  certain  of  its 
destination.  He  did  not  know  that  Burgoyne  had 
returned  from  England  with  large  re -enforcements,  and 
it  seemed  not  improbable  that  the  movement  toward 
Ticonderoga  might  be  a  feint,  while  the  main  body  of 
the  army  in  Canada  should  come  round  by  sea,  and 
form  a  junction  with  the  army  under  General  Howe. 

After  protracted  discussions  in  Congress  as  to  what 
should  be  the  relative  positions  of  Schuyler  and  Gates, 
the  former  being  in  command  of  the  Northern  Depart 
ment,  with  head-quarters  fixed  at  Albany — the  latter 
posted  at  'Ticonderoga,  and  claiming  to  have  an  in 
dependent  command,  on  the  22d  of  May,  General 
Schuyler  was  appointed  to  the  command  of  the  whole 
Northern  Department,  embracing  Ticonderoga,  Fort 
Stanwix,  and  their  dependencies.  He  reached  Albany, 
from  Philadelphia,  on  the  3d  of  June.  Gates  declining 
to  accept  the  command  of  Ticonderoga,  it  was  assigned 
to  General  St.  Clair. 

General  Schuyler  found  that  "  nothing  had  been 
done  during  his  absence  to  improve  the  means  of 
defense  on  the  frontiers.  Nothing,  comparatively 
speaking,  to  supply  Ticonderoga  with  provisions.'7  He 


proceeded  at  once,  with  his  usual  "  activity,  fervor,  and 
energy,"  to  procure  supplies,  rouse  the  committees  of 
Massachusetts,  Connecticut,  and  New  York  to  the  im 
portance  of  sending  forward  their  militia,  and  was  on 
his  way  to  re-enforce  St.  Clair  with  about  2000  men, 
when,  on  the  7th  of  July,  he  received  the  intelligence 
that  Ticonderoga  was  evacuated. 

The  whole  country  was  astounded.  So  great  had 
been  the  confidence  in  the  strength  of  that  post,  that 
the  wildest  rumors  circulated  with  reference  to  the 
cause  of  this  disaster.  General  Schuyler,  as  command 
ing  the  Department,  was  suspected,  and  charges  of  all 
kinds  were  heaped  upon  him,  of  varying  nature.  By 
some  he  was  accused  of  treason,  by  others  of  coward 
ice,  principally  because  he  was  not  present  when  the 
evacuation  occurred.  It  was  asserted  that  he  had 
ordered  the  heavy  cannon  to  be  removed  from  the  fort 
and  smaller  ones  to  be  substituted  for  them.  Absurd 
rumors  were  circulated,  and  believed,  that  the  price 
for  his  treason  was  inclosed  in  balls  shot  by  the  enemy 
into  his  lines. 

It  is  needless  to  dwell  upon  the  well-known  fact  that 
General  Schuyler,  by  the  verdict  of  a  court-martial,  by 
resolutions  of  Congress,  and  by  the  testimony  of  all 
historians  from  that  time  to  this,  is  acquitted  of  all 


6 

blame  for  this  surrender  ;  and,  until  now,  of  all  the 
imputations  growing  out  of  it  to  which  I  have  referred. 

After  the  evacuation  of  Ticonderoga  and  the  losses 
at  Hubbardton,  General  St.  Clair  was  five  days  wan 
dering,  unheard  from,  through  the  woods  of  Vermont, 
and  finally  joined  General  Schuyler  at  Fort  Edward 
with  only  "1500  regulars,  the  militia  having  all 
returned  to  their  homes."  They  were  "without  tents 
or  artillery — sickness,  distress,  and  desertion  prevail- 
ing." 

From  this  time,  until  relieved  of  his  command  by 
General  Gates,  which  was  after  the  defeat  of  St.  Leger 
and  the  battle  of  Bennington,  the  conduct  of  the  cam 
paign  by  General  Schuyler  has  met  with  the  unqualified 
approbation  of  those  who  have  studied  its  details  or 
written  its  history,  until  the  appearance  of  Mr.  Ban 
croft's  ninth  volume. 

Chancellor  Kent  says:  "The  enemy  kept  pressing 
upon  his  advanced  posts,  but  in  the  midst  of  unparal 
leled  difficulties  his  retreat  was  slow  and  safe,  and 
every  inch  of  ground  disputed." 

Speaking  of  the  state  of  his  army,  he  says  :  "By  the 
advice  of  a  council  of  general  officers,  Schuyler  was 
obliged  to  let  one  half  of  the  militia  go  home,  under  a 
promise  of  the  residue  to  continue  for  three  weeks." 


Irving,  in  describing  Washington's  admirable  fore 
sight  at  this  time,  says:  "Due  credit  must  also  be 
given  to  the  sagacious  counsels  and  executive  energy 
of  Schuyler,  who  suggested  some  of  the  best  moves  in 
the  campaign,  and  carried  them  vigorously  into  action. 
Never  was  Washington  more  ably  and  loyally  seconded 
by  any  of  his  generals." 

Chief- Justice  Marshall,  in  his  Life  of  Washington, 
says  :   "In  this  gloomy  state  of  things  no  officer  could 
have  exerted  more  diligence  and  skill  than  Schuyler." 
He  describes  with  fervor  his  proceedings — the  impedi 
ments  thrown  in  the  way  of  an  advance  by  Burgoyne— 
the  destruction  of  roads,  bridges,  and  growing  crops— 
the  driving  away  of  live  stock,  and  his  endeavors  to 
divide  the  enemy's  force  by  posting  troops  upon  his 
flanks. 

I  have  thus,  generally,  referred  to  these  accounts,  in 
order  to  contrast  what  has  hitherto  been  the  estimate 
of  General  Schuyler's  conduct  and  personal  attributes 
in  this  campaign,  with  that  now  given  by  Mr.  Bancroft. 
He  writes  as  follows  : 

"Meantime  the  British  were  never  harried  by  the 
troops  with  Schuyler,  against  whom  public  opinion  was 
rising.  Men  reasoned  rightly,  that,  if  Ticonderoga  was 
untenable,  he  should  have  known  it,  and  given  timely 


orders  for  its  evacuation  ;  instead  of  which,  he  had 
been  heaping  up  stores  there  to  the  last.  To  screen 
his  popularity,  he  insisted  that  the  retreat  was  made 
without  the  least  hint  from  himself,  and  was  '  ill- 
judged,  and  not  warranted  by  necessity.'  With  manly 
frankness  St.  Glair  assumed  the  whole  responsibility 
of  the  praiseworthy  act  which  had  saved  to  the  country 
many  of  its  bravest  defenders. 

"  Schuyler  owed  his  place  to  his  social  position- 
not  to  military  talents.  Anxious,  and  suspected  of  a 
want  of  personal  courage,  he  found  everything  go  ill 
under  his  command.  To  the  Continental  troops  of  St. 
Clair,  who  were  suffering  from  the  loss  of  their  clothes 
and  tents,  he  was  unable  to  restore  confidence  ;  nor 
could  he  rouse  the  people.  The  choice  for  Governor 
of  New  York  fell  on  George  Clinton  ;  '  his  character, ' 
said  Washington  to  the  Council  of  Safety,  '  will  make 
him  peculiarly  useful  at  the  head  of  your  State.' 
Schuyler  wrote  :  '  His  family  and  connections  do  not 
entitle  him  to  so  distinguished  pre-eminence.'  The  aid 
of  Vermont  was  needed  ;  Schuyler  would  never  address 
its  Secretary  except  in  his  '  private  capacity.'  There 
could  be  no  hope  of  a  successful  campaign,  but  with 
the  hearty  co-operation  of  New  England  ;  yet  Schuyler 
gave  leave  for  one  half  of  its  militia  to  go  home  at 


9 

once,  and  the  rest  to  follow  in  three  weeks,  and  then 
called  upon  Washington  to  supply  their  places  by 
troops  from  the  south  of  Hudson  River,  saying  to  his 
friends  that  one  Southern  soldier  was  worth  two  from 
New  England. 

"  On  the  twenty-second,  long  before  Burgoyne  was 
ready  to  advance,  Schuyler  retreated  to  a  position 
four  miles  below  Fort  Edward.  Here  again  he  com 
plained  of  his  '  exposure  to  immediate  ruin.'  His 
friends  urged  him  to  silence  the  growing  suspicion  of 
his  cowardice  ;  he  answered  :  '  If  there  is  a  battle,  I 
shall  certainly  expose  myself  more  than  is  prudent. ? 
To  the  New  York  Council  of  Safety  he  wrote  on  the 
twenty-fourth  :  '  I  mean  to  dispute  every  inch  of  ground 
with  Burgoyne,  and  retard  his  descent  as  long  as  pos 
sible  ;'  and  in  less  than  a  week,  without  disputing  any 
thing,  he  retreated  to  Saratoga,  having  his  heart  set 
on  a  position  at  the  junction  of  the  Mohawk  and 
Hudson.  The  courage  of  the  commander  being  gone, 
his  officers  and  his  army  became  spiritless  ;  and,  as  his 
only  resource,  he  solicited  aid  from  Washington  with 
unreasoning  importunity." 

Further  on,  he  says  :  "  All  this  while  Schuyler  con 
tinued  to  despond.  On  the  thirteenth  of  August  he 
could  write  from  Stillwater  to  Washington  :  'We  are 


10 

obliged  to  give  way  and  retreat  before  a  vastly  supe 
rior  force,  daily  increasing  in  numbers,  and  which  will 
be  doubled  if  General  Burgoyne  reaches  Albany,  which, 
I  apprehend,  will  be  very  soon ;'  and  the  next  day, 
flying  from  a  shadow  cast  before  him,  he  moved  his 
army  to  the  first  island  in  the  mouth  of  the  Mohawk 
River.  He  pitied  the  man  who  should  succeed  him, 
and  accepted  the  applause  of  his  admirers  at  Albany 
for  '  the  wisdom  of  his  safe  retreat/  For  all  this  half- 
heartedness,  the  failure  of  Burgoyne  was  certain  ;  but 
the  glory  of  his  defeat  was  reserved  for  soldiers  of  Vir 
ginia,  New  York,  and  New  England.77 

Upon  my  return  from  Europe  (in  December  last),  I 
read  Mr.  Bancroft's  volume,  and  having  determined,  as 
far  as  possible,  to  confine  myself  to  what  I  consider  per 
sonal  in  this  matter,  viz. :  that  General  Schuyler's  con 
duct  of  the  campaign  was  influenced  by  cowardice,  I 
asked  Mr.  Bancroft  for  the  authority  upon  which  this 
view  was  founded.  He  sent  me  the  following  docu 
ments  : 

Extract  of  a  letter  from  Richard  Montgomery  to  Robt.  R.  Livingston, 

dated 

NEW  YORK,  3d  June,  1775. 

"  Phil.  Schuyler  was  mentioned  to  rne  by  Mr.  Scot,  [for  Major-General 
for  New  York.]  His  consequence  in  the  province  makes  him  a  fit  subject 
for  an  important  trust,  but  has  he  strong  nerves  ?  I  could  wish  to  have 


11 


that  point  well  ascertained  with  respect  to  any  man  so  employed." — Liv 
ingston  Papers,  1775-1777,  pp.  31  and  33. 


Extract  of  a  letter  from  Samuel  Adams  to  Richard  Henry  Lee,  dated 

PHILADELPHIA,  July  15, 1777. 

"  We  have  Letters  from  Genl.  Schuyler  in  the  Northern  Department 
giving  us  an  account  of  the  untoward  situation  of  our  afi'airs  in  that  Quar 
ter.  I  confess  it  is  no  more  than  I  expected  when  he  [Schuyler]  was  again 
appointed  to  the  command  there.  You  know  that  it  was  urg;d  by  some 
Gentlemen,  that  as  he  had  a  large  interest  and  powerfull  connections  in 
that  part  of  the  country,  no  one  could  so  readily  avail  himself  of  supplies 
for  an  army  there,  if  wanted  upon  an  emergency,  as  he  could.  A  most 
substantial  reason  why  he  should  have  been  appointed  a  Quarter  Master 
or  a  Commissary.  But  it  seems  to  have  been  a  prevailing  motive  to  ap 
point  him  to  the  chief  command.  You  have  his  account  in  the  inclosed 
News  Paper,  which  leaves  us  to  guess  what  is  become  of  the  Garrison. 
It  is  indeed  droll  enough  to  see  a  General  not  knowing  where  to  find  the 
main  Body  of  his  Army  !  Gates  is  the  man  of  my  choice.  He  is  honest 
and  true,  and  has  the  art  of  gaining  the  Love  of  his  Soldiers,  particularly 
because  he  is  always  present  and  shares  with  them  in  Fatigue  and  Danger. 
But  Gates  has  been  disgusted  !  We  are  hourly  expecting  to  be  relieved 
from  this  disagreeable  state  of  uncertainty,  by  a  particular  account  from 
some  person  who  was  near  the  army,  who  trusts  not  to  memory  altogether, 
lest  some  circumstances  may  be  omitted  while  others  are  misapprehended.'7 
— Papers  of  Samuel  Adams,  IV.,  912. 


Extract  of  an  original  copy  or  draft  of  a  letter  from  Jay  to  tichuyler,  dated 

21st  July,  1777. 

"  A  certain  gentleman  of  that  board  [the  New  York  Council,]  whom  I 
need  not  name,  and  from  whom  I  do  not  desire  this  information  should  be 

2 


12 


concealed,  is  your  secret  enemy ;  he  professes  much  respect  &c  for  you  j 
he  can;t  see  thro?  the  business  •  he  wishes  you  had  been  nearer  to  the  fort, 
[Ticonderoga]  though  he  does  not  doubt  your  spirit ;  he  thinks  we  ought  to 
suspend  our  judgment,  and  not  censure  you  rashly." — America,  1777,  II., 


Gen.  Schuyler  to  Jolm  Jay. 

MOSES  CREEK,  July  27,  1777. 
DEAR  SIR  : 

General  Arnold  who  is  advanced  with  two  Brigades  of  continental  troops, 
and  the  militia  of  the  county  of  Albany,  about  two  miles  in  our  front,  has 
just  informed  me  that  the  enemy  have  appeared  on  the  heights  above  Fort 
Edward  in  considerable  force,  and  that  from  these  movements  he  judges 
an  attack  will  be  made  to  day.  Loth  as  I  am  that  a  general  engagement 
should  ensue,  and  that  I  will  take  every  prudent  measure  to  prevent  it,  it 
is  not  impossible  but  it  may  take  place,  and  as  the  fate  of  every  person 
engaged  in  it  is  uncertain,  as  I  shall  certainly  be  there,  and  in  order  to 
inspirit  my  troops  shall  expose  myself  more  than  it  is  prudent  for  a  com 
manding  officer  to  do,  I  may  possibly  get  rid  of  the  cares  of  this  life,  or 
fall  into  their  hands :  in  either  case  I  entreat  you  to  rescue  my  memory 
from  that  load  of  calumny  that  ever  follows  the  unfortunate.  My  papers 
will  furnish  you  with  sufficient  materials,  and  I  trust  that  the  goodness  of 
your  heart  will  induce  you  to  devote  a  part  of  your  time  to  it.  I  leave 
this  with  my  Secretary  to  be  sent  to  you,  if  I  shall  not  return.  I  am  this 
moment  going  to  mount.  Adieu ! 

ENDORSED  :  To  be  sent  if  any  accident  should  happen  to  me. 
[No  accident  happened,  but  the  letter  was  sent  to  Jay.J 


Wm.  Duer  to  Gen.  Schuyler. 

PHILADELPHIA,  29th  July,  1777. 

[EXTRACT.] 

There  is  but  oue  thing  for  yon  to  do  to  establish  your  character  on  such 
a  basis  that  even  suspicion  itself  shall  be  silent,  and  in  doing  this,  you  will 


13 


I  am  conscious  follow  the  impulse  of  your  own  heart.  From  the  nature  of 
your  department,  and  other  unavoidable  causes  you  have  not  during  the 
course  of  this  war  had  an  opportunity  of  evincing  that  spirit  which  I  and 
your  more  intimate  friends  know  you  to  possess.  Of  this  circumstance 
prejudice  takes  a  cruel  advantage,  and  malice  lends  an  easy  ear  to  her  dic 
tates.  You  will  not  I  am  sure  see  this  place  till  your  conduct  gives  the 
lie  to  this  insinuation,  as  it  has  done  before  to  every  other  which  your 
enemies  have  so  industriously  circulated. — Rev.  Papers,  355-357. 


Extract  of  a  letter  from  Gen.  Richard  Montgomery,  to  Gen.  Schuyler, 

dated 

August,  1777. 

Moving  without  your  orders,  I  do  not  like;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
prevention  of  the  enemy  is  of  the  utmost  consequence  ;  for  if  he  gets  his 
vessels  into  the  Lake,  it  is  over  with  us  for  the  present  summer.  Let  me 
entreat  you  to  follow  in  a  whale  boat,  leaving  some  one  to  bring  on  the 
troops  and  artillery.  It  will  give  the  men  great  confidence  in  your  spirit 
and  activity ;  and  how  necessary  to  a  general  this  confidence  is,  1  need  not 
tell  you.  I  most  earnestly  wish,  that  this  may  meet  your  approbation  ; 
and  be  assured  that  I  have  your  honor  and  reputation  much  at  heart. 
— Sparks'  Am.  Biography,  vol.  I.,  pp.  194-195. 


Extract  of  a  letter  from  Gen.  Schuyler  to  Wm.  Duer,  dated 

ALBANY,  August  8,  1777. 

"  The  scoundrels  that  doubt  my  personal  fortitude  dare  not  pat  it  to  the 
tryal." — Revolutionary  Papers,  373. 


Col.  Udney  Hay  to  Geo.  Clinton. 

STILL  WATER,  August  13,  1777. 
SIR: 

I  lament  I  cannot  give  your  Excellency  a  better  account  of  things  here. 
Misfortunes  and  fatigue  have  broken  down  the  discipline  and  spirits  of  the 


troops  and  converted  them  in  a  great  degree  into  a  rabble.  They  seem  to 
have  lost  all  confidence  in  themselves  and  their  leaders.  The  militia  seem 
to  be  infected  with  the  same  spirit.  Such  as  are  with  us  are  good  for 
nothing  but  to  eat  and  waste  and  grumble,  and  those  at  home  think  home 
safest.  When  I  tell  you  that  the  sight  of  twenty  or  thirty  Indians  on  our 
flank  or  rear,  fills  the  whole  camp  with  alarm,  and  that  the  act  of  shoot 
ing  one  from  behind  the  walls  of  a  log  cabin  has  been  commemorated  in 
General  Orders  as  a  proof  of  great  gallantry,  your  Excellency  will  be  able 
to  judge  of  what  will  probably  happen,  if  by  any  accident  we  are  brought 
into  close  contact  with  Burgoyne's  veterans.  But  of  such  an  event  there  is 
little  danger.  We  first  collected  at  Fort  Edward,  but  quickly  left  that  for 
a  strong  position  on  Moses'  Creek.  The  Indians  soon  made  this  uncom 
fortable,  when  we  removed  here  and  began  a  fortified  camp,  but  here  we 
are  not  safe,  and  I  am  under  orders  for  another  move.  Van  Schaick's 
Island  is  thought  to  be  safe  against  the  attacks  of  Indians,  and  there  we 
go.  Should  he  [Gates]  not  come  soon,  your  Excellency  may  expect  to 
hear  that  our  Headquarters  are  removed  to  Albany. 


[Collection  of  Papers,  431-433.] 
Jas.  Duane  to  Gen.  Schuyler. 

PHILAD.  23d  Augt.,  1777. 
[EXTRACT.] 

The  change  of  command  was  founded  merely  on  the  representation  of 
the  Eastern  States,  that  their  militia  suspicious  of  your  military  character, 
would  not  turn  out  in  defense  of  New  York  while  you  presided  in  the 
Northern  Department. 

•*•******* 

All  your  friends  wish  that  fortune  may  put  it  in  your  power  to  give  some 
signal  proof  of  the  only  military  talent  which  you  have  not  evidenced  in 
the  course  of  your  command  for  want  of  an  opportunity. 


Iii  the  correspondence  which  ensued  with  Mr.  Ban 
croft  I   did  not  deem  it  necessary,  in  each  case  which 


15 

admitted  of  it,  to  show  that  the  extract  was  qualified 
by  the  general  tenor  of  the  letter. 

General  Montgomery's  familiar  letter  to  his  brother- 
in-law,  written  in  1775,  before  the  army  appointments 
were  made,  and  speculating  upon  the  fitness  of  the 
candidates,  will  hardly  pass  as  the  expression  of  an 
opinion. 

The  letter  of  Mr.  Jay,  of  July  21st,  1777,  is  pub 
lished  at  length  in  his  life  by  his  son,  William  Jay.  It- 
is  a  long  and  sympathizing  letter,  enumerating  all  the 
rumors  in  circulation  as  to  the  loss  of  Ticonderoga,  to 
which  I  have  previously  referred. 

If  from  this  letter  Mr.  Bancroft  can  find  any  ground 
for  imputing  cowardice  to  General  Schuyler,  he  would 
have  much  stronger  reasons  for  accusing  him  of  treason 
and  dishonesty. 

This  also  applies  to  several  of  the  other  extracts, 
when  read  in  connection  with  the  whole  letters. 

At  this  time,  it  seemed  to  me,  that  Mr.  Bancroft  must 
have  been  accidentally  led  to  ignore  all  other  rumors 
connected  with  the  loss  of  Ticonderoga,  while  endeavor 
ing  to  fasten  this  one  as  a  permanent  stain  on  General 
Schuyler's  character.  In  this  spirit  I  commented,  as 
follows,  upon  what  he  advances  as  sufficient  authority 
for  his  version  : 


16 

NEW  YORK,  Dec.  28th,  1866. 
HON.  GEORGE  BANCROFT, 
DEAR  SIR: 

I  have  read  with  interest,  in  your  last  volume,  the  account 
of  the  Northern  campaign  of  1777,  and  am  much  disappointed 
at  the  conclusions  you  have  arrived  at  in  regard  to  the 
public  services  of  my  grandfather,  General  Schuyler. 

I  should  not,  of  course,  trouble  you  with  any  personal 
communication  on  that  score.  You  have,  however,  by  way 
of  explaining  his  want  of  success,  attacked  his  private  char 
acter,  hitherto  unimpeached,  attributing  to  him  want  of  per 
sonal  courage,  the  gravest  charge  which  can  be  brought 
against  a  soldier. 

It  is  but  fair  to  assume  that  you  have  made  this  charge 
from  a  sense  of  duty,  and  based  upon,  what  seems  to  you, 
conclusive  evidence. 

As  the  representative  of  General  Schuyler,  you  cannot 
deem  it  unreasonable  in  me  to  ask  you,  at  your  earliest 
leisure,  for  access  to  the  sources  of  information  which  have 
authorized  you  to  make  these  broad  statements  to  his  dis 
honor. 

Respectfully  yours,  &c., 

GEORGE  L.  SCHUYLER. 


NEW  YORK,  Dec.  38th,  1866. 
MY  DEAR  MR.  SCHUYLER  : 

I  this  moment  receive  your  letter  of  to-day.  I  think  you 
cannot  have  read  my  volume  with  care.  I  represent  the  loss 
of  Ticonderoga  as  that  which  must  have  taken  place  whoever 
had  been  in  command ;  and  I  explain  the  diminution  of  Gen 
eral  Schuyler's  force  as  a  consequence  of  the  state  of  feeling 
between  himself  and  the  New  England  men.  Were  it  anybody 


17 


but  one  like  you,  for  whom  I  cherish  a  most  sincere  regard,  I 
might  decline  anything  that  could  lead  to  a  private  discussion 
of  questions  appertaining  to  history ;  but  to  you  I  prefer  to 
say  that  if  you  will  specify  any  passage  of  mine  of  the  char 
acter  which  you  indicate,  I  will  endeavor  to  set  before  you 

grounds  for  the  statement. 

Very  truly  yours, 

GEO.  BANCROFT. 


NEW  YORK,  Dec.  29th,  1866. 
DEAR  SIR: 

The  words  which  bear  upon  the  private  character  of  General 
Schuyler,  referred  to  in  my  note  of  yesterday,  are  on  pages 
372  and  373  of  your  last  volume. 

'•Anxious,  and  suspected  of  a  want  of  personal  courage? 

"  His  friends  urged  him  to  silence  the  growing  suspicion  of 
his  cowardice." 

Page  374  you  give  an  intimation  that  Washington  shared  in 
these  views ;  but  as  the  expression  "  want  of  fortitude"  admits 
of  a  different  construction,  I  confine  myself,  as  stated  in  my 
note,  to  asking  for  the  grounds  on  which  you  are  satisfied  to 
write  of  General  Schuyler  as  a  man  suspected  of  want  of 

personal  courage. 

Respectfully  yours, 

GEORGE  L.  SCHUYLER. 

The  same  day  I  received  from  Mr.  Bancroft  the  extracts 
already  published. 


NEW  YORK,  January  16th,  1867. 
DEAR  SIR: 

Absence  from  New  York  has  prevented  me  from  acknowl 
edging,  at  an  earlier  date,  the  receipt  of  your  note  of  Decem 
ber  29th,  and  the  documents  accompanying  it. 


18 


When  I  asked  for  the  evidence  upon  which,  in  your  History 
of  the  Campaign  of  1777,  you  stamp  the  private  character  of 
General  Schuyler  as  a  man  "  suspected  of  want  of  personal 
courage,"  I  did  not  propose  to  question  the  fact  that  reports  to 
that  effect  were  circulated  in  obscure  or  interested  quarters. 

He  was,  in  like  manner,  suspected  of  frauds  upon  the  Gov 
ernment  ;  of  treason  to  the  national  cause ;  of  every  minor 
offense  that  prejudice  or  malice  could  devise,  by  some  who 
had  private  animosities  to  avenge,  and  by  others  who,  in  public 
life,  were  aiming  at  the  removal  of  those  generals  who  placed 
implicit  confidence  in  the  ability  and  patriotism  of  Washing 
ton  ;  thus  inaugurating  a  policy  which  was  to  culminate  in 
the  appointment  of  General  Gates  as  Commander-in-Chief  of 
the  armies  of  the  United  States. 

All  of  these  charges  which  were  brought  forward  with  any 
semblance  of  authority  were  closely  investigated  and  refuted. 
Most  of  them  were  withdrawn  by  the  parties  who  made  them. 

A  Committee  of  Inquiry  of  Congress  made  a  report  which 
placed  the  character  of  General  Schuyler  "  higher  than  ever 
as  an  able  and  active  commander,  and  a  zealous  and  disinter 
ested  patriot." 

When  the  charge  of  treason,  with  documents  supposed  am 
ply  to  sustain  it,  was  forwarded  to  General  Washington,  he 
thus  writes  to  General  Schuyler :  u  I  look  upon  the  charge 
against  you  with  an  eye  of  disbelief,  and  sentiments  of  detes 
tation  and  abhorrence." 

Of  the  vague  rumors  that  want  of  personal  courage  was 
among  the  causes  which  influenced  General  Schuyler  in  his 
policy  of  retarding  the  advance  of  Burgoyne  for  more  than 
two  months  to  a  progress  of  half  a  mile  a  day,  until  the  en 
listment  of  fresh  troops  enabled  him,  as  he  did,  to  take  the 
offensive,  no  public  notice  appears  ever  to  have  been  taken. 
His  plan,  approved  by  Washington,  and  sustained  by  all  sub 
sequent  military  criticism,  except  yours,  when  once  under 


19 


stood,  seems  to  have  left  such  rumors  to  fall  to  the  ground. 
Nor  am  I  aware  that  they  were  ever  called  up  again  during 
his  after  career. 

This  portion  of  your  history  appears  nearly  fifty  years  after 
the  actors  in  the  war  of  the  Revolution  have  passed  away.  It 
is  written  in  the  narrative*  style ;  authorities  are  not  referred 
to,  but  quotations  of  sentences  are  freely  interpolated  in  the 
text ;  a  method  which  gives  force  and  weight  to  a  paragraph, 
but  dangerous  as  to  the  correctness  of  the  impressions  which 
may  be  produced. 

Your  conclusions,  as  you  state  in  the  preface,  are  the  result 
of  long  study  and  investigation,  and  of  a  careful  weighing  of 
testimony  as  regards  the  public  services  and  private  character 
of  those  of  whom'  you  treat.  When,  therefore,  you  attribute  to 
"  want  of  personal  courage  "  General  Schuyler's  management 
of  the  Campaign  of  1777,  no  one  who  reads,  can  doubt  that 
your  impressions  are  based  upon  evidence  of  a  most  convin 
cing  kind.  But  if  this  is  not  the  case;  if,  nearly  a  hundred 
years  after  the  termination  of  his  military  career,  such  charges 
can  be  brought  up  against  a  commanding  general,  based 
only  upon  the  camp  gossip  and  partisan  rumors  of  the  day, 
what  man's  reputation  is  safe  ? 

Who,  of  the  generals  ranking  among  the  first  in  our  late 
war  of  the  rebellion,  is  not  aware  that  his  official  conduct  and 
his  private  character  have  both  been  assailed,  at  times,  by  ig 
norance,  prejudice,  or  malice  ;  that  reports  have  been  circu 
lated  which  personal  friends  have  commented  upon  with  bit 
terness,  urging  him  to  refute  them  by  word  or  deed,  and  yet 
who  lives  on  with  the  firm  assurance  that,  when  the  future 
historian  shall  examine  calmly  and  without  prejudice  into  his 
personal  character  and  official  career,  they  will  not  have  a 
feather's  weight  in  determining  the  position  he  is  to  hold  in 
the  estimation  of  succeeding  generations  ? 

Presuming,  therefore,  that  you  are  acting  upon  fair  and 

3 


20 


deliberate  conviction,  and  after  careful  examination,  the 
papers  you  inclose  to  me,  as  giving  the  just  grounds  for  the 
conclusions  to  which  you  have  arrived,  seem  to  me  wholly 
insufficient.  Many  of  them  do  not  refer  to  his  personal 
character  at  all,  and  those  that  do,  only  prove  that  such 
reports  existed ;  that  they  were  fostered  by  the  political  and 
private  enemies  of  General  Schuyler,  to  the  great  indigna 
tion  of  his  personal  friends,  who  treat  them  with  contempt. 

I  shall  refer  to  them  generally.  When  General  Mont 
gomery,  having  learned  that  Carleton  had  completed  his 
armed  vessels  at  St.  Johns,  hastened  to  the  Isle  au  Noix 
without  orders,  he  knew,  as  you  are  aware,  that  General 
Schuyler  was,  by  order  of  Congress,  attending  a  Conference 
of  the  Six  Nations  at  Albany.  He  felt  the  importance  of  his 
presence,  as  the  campaign  was  about  to  open.  Their  personal 
relations  were  of  the  warmest  kind.  General  Montgomery, 
than  whom  no  braver  man  lived,  always  leaned  upon  the 
support  of  General  Schuyler  for  his  greater  powers  of  organ 
ization,  as  well  as  for  his  indefatigable  spirit  and  energy. 
You  are  also  aware  that  General  Schuyler  did  join  him  im 
mediately  upon  the  receipt  of  his  letter,  though  suffering 
under  illness  of  the  most  excruciating  character. 

The  letter  you  inclose  from  General  Montgomery  is  not 
the  whole  letter,  or  a  continuous  extract  from  it.  Your  clerk, 
in  transcribing  it,  has  omitted  the  closing  words  of  the  last 
sentence.  He  ends  his  extract  with  these  words :  "  Be 
assured  I  have  your  honor  and  reputation  much  at  heart ;" 
but  the  sentence  is  as  follows:  "Be  assured  I  have  your 
honor  and  reputation  much  at  heart,  as  of  the  greatest  con 
sequence  to  the  public  service; — that  all  my  ambition  is  to 
do  my  duty  in  a  subordinate  capacity,  without  the  least 
ungenerous  intention  of  lessening  that  merit  so  justly  your 
due,  and  which  I  omit  no  opportunity  of  setting  in  its  full 
est  light."  General  Montgomery  was  no  hypocrite. 


21 


I  find  nothing  in  this  letter,  or  in  anything  said  or  written 
by  General  Montgomery,  which  even  alludes  to  the  question 
of  General  Schuyler's  personal  courage.  Their  relations  were 
close  and  warm  up  to  the  glorious  end  of  Montgomery's 
career.  They  were  both  "  suspected  of  want  of  skill  and 
bravery"  by  rumors  attributed  to  General  Wooster  (though 
subsequently  denied  by  him  to  be  true),  and  each  did  all  in 
his  power  to  encourage  and  support  the  other,  under  the  load 
of  difficulties,  caused  by  malice  and  insubordination,  which 
tried  them  almost  beyond  power  of  endurance. 

The  sneers  of  Samuel  Adams  fall  harmlessly  to  the  ground 
when  he  insinuates  of  General  Schuyler  what  he  does  of 
Washington,  criticising  his  "  Fabian  policy"  as  being  caused 
by  want  of  proper  spirit,  and  when  he  launches  forth  in 
praises  of  the  honesty,  truth  and  courage  of  Gates,  "  the  man 
of  his  choice."* 

All  that  he  says  of  General  Schuyler's  ignorance  of  the 
whereabouts  of  St.  Glair,  after  his  flight  from  Ticonderoga, 
and  his  insinuations  as  to  General  Schuyler's  not  being  where 
he  could  give  an  account  of  that  affair,  of  course  have  no 
weight  in  forming  your  opinion,  as  a  very  few  days  sufficed, 
after  that  letter  was  written,  to  explain  the  reasons,  which 
are  well  known  to  you. 

I  almost  think  that  General  Schuyler's  letter  to  John  Jay 
has  been  sent  to  me  by  mistake. 

When  near  the  prospect  of  a  general  engagement,  which 
he  desires,  if  possible,  to  prevent, — (he  had  but  4500  men, 


*  The  biographer  of  Samuel  Adams  thus  comments  upon  the  result  of  his 
persevering  and  successful  efforts  in  Congress  to  obtain  General  Schuyler's 
removal : 

"  Time  has  removed  from  General  Schuyler  all  blame  in  the  disasters,  and  the 
investigation  of  his  conduct  resulted  in  his  honorable  acquittal.  The  substitu 
tion  of  Gates  gave  to  the  country  a  General  who  was  in  no  respect  superior  to 
Schuyler,  than  whom  a  braver  or  more  trustworthy  patriot  never  lived." 


22 


regulars  and  militia  included,  to  oppose  to  the  whole  army  of 
Burgoyne,) — at  the  same  time,  if  it  does  occur,  feeling  there 
is  a  necessity,  "  with  a  smaller  and  dispirited  force,  for  him 
to  expose  himself  more  than  is  customary  for  a  command 
ing  officer  to  do,"  it  does  not  seem  to  me  unmanly  in 
General  Schuyler  to  confide  this  to  a  most  intimate  personal 
friend,  and  to  request  him,  in  case  of  accident,  to  take  charge 
o$  his  papers,  and  relieve  his  memory  from  "  that  load  of 
calumny  that  ever  follows  the  unfortunate."  On  the  con 
trary,  it  seems  to  me  to  show  that  at  such  a  time  it  was  not 
fear  of  death,  but  of  the  loss  of  reputation,  dearer  to  him 
than  life,  which  was  uppermost  in  General  Schuyler's 
thoughts  and  feelings. 

The  letter  of  Colonel  Udney  Hay  to  George  Clinton  is  but 
an  ignorant  criticism  of  the  plan  of  a  campaign  which  he  did 
not  comprehend,  while  the  letter  of  Mr.  Duer  refers  to  the 
malicious  reports  in  circulation  after  the  loss  of  Ticonderoga, 
apparently  to  assure  General  Schuyler  how  much  they  pro 
voke,  but  how  little  they  move,  him  and  others  of  his  personal 
friends. 

Had  you  deemed  it  worth  while  to  have  copied  for  my  use 
the  whole  of  this  letter,  as  published  in  Irving's  History  (Vol. 
iii.,  p.  132),  the  bearing  of  your  extract,  as  in  the  case  of 
General  Montgomery's  letter,  would  have  been  better  under 
stood. 

The  partial  extracts  of  letters  of  Jay  and  Duane  show  still 
more  clearly  that  these  reports  are  fomented  by  personal  and 
political  foes,  who  endeavor  to  keep  themselves  out  of  sight. . 

Well  may  General  Schuyler  say,  in  his  reply  to  Mr.  Duer, 
"  The  scoundrels  who  doubt  my  personal  fortitude  dare  not 
put  it  to  the  trial." 

On  the  other  hand,  the,  whole  tenor  of  General  Schuyler's 
character  and  pursuits  seems  to  be  at  variance  with  the  con 
clusions  you  have  drawn  from  these  very  slight  premises. 


23 


He  was  descended  from  a  family  which,  from  the  first  settle 
ment  of  the  Colony,  ever  bore  an  active  and  honorable  part  in 
the  savage  warfare  which  characterized  the  contests  of  those 

o 

days,  when  small  bodies  of  men  met  in  close  conflict,  and 
when  battles  were  more  especially  lost  or  won  by  the  personal 
bearing  of  those  who  were  engaged  in  them. 

In  that  region,  between  the  lakes  and  the  upper  waters  of 
the  Hudson,  appropriately  styled  "  the  bloody  ground  "  of  the 
Colony  of  New  York,  there  is  scarcely  a  district  where  he  could 
not  point  to  the  grave  of  an  ancestor,  or  to  some  record  of  their 
unflinching  energy  in  victory  or  defeat.  This  may  appear  to 
you  irrelevant,  but  it  ought,  and  does,  have  its  weight  when 
we  are  called  upon  to  believe  that  a  man  with  such  antece 
dents  should  have  so  basely  degenerated  in  heart,  while  he 
apparently  followed  so  closely  in  the  footsteps  of  his  ances 
tors,  making  war  the  profession  of  his  choice,  when  there  was 
but  little  inducement  for  a  native  of  the  Colony  to  enter  the 
service  of  the  British  army. 

At  eighteen  years  of  age  he  embarked  in  those  expeditions 
among  the  Indians  of  the  Six  Nations,  which  were  always  cus 
tomary  with  his  family,  when  he  obtained  that  influence  over 
them,  afterward  so  important  in  the  war  of  the  Revolution, 
an  influence  based  in  part  upon  his  reputation  for  truth  and 
justice;  but  of  far  more  weight  with  that  rude  and  warlike 
race  was  his  wide-spread  renown  for  activity,  firmness,  and 
contempt  of  danger. 

He  served  in  the  old  French  war  as  a  captain,  under  Colonel 
Bradstreet,  one  of  the  bravest  and  most  adventurous  of  the 
commanders  of  the  time.  He  was  by  his  side  through  a  severe 
tight  of  unequal  numbers  on  the  Oswego  River,  and  there  had 
an  occasion  for  displaying  qualities  of  humanity  which  savor 
little  of  want  of  self-confidence  or  courage. 

"  When  it  became  necessary  to  abandon  the  island  to  meet 
the  enemy,  advancing  in  large  numbers  on  the  shore  of  the 


24 


river,  there  being  but  one  batteau,  already  overloaded,  the 
soldiers  refused,  on  the  score  of  safety,  to  receive  in  it  a 
wounded  soldier  of  the  enemy.  Captain  Schuyler,  handing 
his  weapons  and  coat  to  a  companion,  bore  the  wounded  man 
to  the  water,  swam  with  him  on  his  back  across  the  deep 
channel,  placed  him  in  the  hands  of  a  surgeon,  and  joined  his 
command  in  time  to  lead  them  in  the  severe  fight  which  fol 
lowed,  and  which  ended  in  the  repulse  of  the  enemy." 

With  General  Bradstreet  he  maintained  the  closest  personal 
relations,  which  lasted  through  life.  So  also  with  Lord  Vis 
count  Howe,  who  fell  at  Ticonderoga.  With  all  his  brother 
officers,  after  the  peace  of  1763,  he  held  a  place  utterly  in 
compatible  with  any  suspicion  as  to  his  wanting  personal 
courage. 

His  subsequent  career  as  a  member  of  the  Colonial  Legis 
lature,  and  of  various  other  public  bodies,  was  marked  by  a 
boldness  and  independence  which  often  put  both  his  moral 
and  personal  courage  to  the  proof. 

When  a  frightened  and  pliant  legislature,  composed  almost 
exclusively  of  men  of  wealth  and  high  standing,  strove  to 
crush  the  somewhat  violent  remonstrances  of  the  advocates  of 
popular  rights  by  proposing  measures  to  detect  and  imprison 
the  authors  of  them,  he  alone  stood  up  for  their  rights ;  and 
the  sole  negative  vote  on  the  record,  in  their  behalf,  is  that  of 
Philip  Schuyler. 

Private  letters  show  that  he  was  ready,  if  necessary,  to 
respond  to  the  custom  of  his  time,  which  required  personal 
satisfaction  to  be  given  for  real  or  supposed  injuries,  and 
from  which  no  family  has  suffered  more  than  his  own ;  a 
custom  now  almost  generally  condemned,  but  the  observance 
of  which  was  then  deemed  indispensable. 

When  subsequently  appointed  a  Major-General  in  the  Army 
of  the  United  States,  the  only  period  of  his  life  to  which  the 
rumors  now  under  consideration  refer,  it  is  difficult  to  dis- 


25 


criminate  between  the  personal  character  of  the  man  and  his 
public  services  as  a  commanding  officer ;  the  latter  being  a  sub- 
ject  from  which,  in  this  correspondence,  I  purposely  refrain. 

As  against  the  rumors,  however,  upon  which  your  conclu 
sions  are  founded,  I  am  satisfied  to  rest  General  Schuyler's 
reputation  as  a  man  of  courage,  upon  general  grounds.  If  a 
person  so  situated  has  been  wanting  in  courage,  it  is  generally 
not  difficult  to  establish  the  fact ;  but  it  is  not  always  easy  to 
prove  positively  the  reverse,  unless  circumstances  have  af 
forded  an  exceptional  opportunity  in  the  case  of  a  general 
officer  to  do  so. 

General  Schuyler  has  now  been  dead  more  than  sixty  years. 
Sufficient  time  has  elapsed  to  form  an  impartial  estimate  of 
his  private  character,  as  well  as  of  his  public  services.  What 
ever  may  be  thought  of  the  latter,  no  man  until  now  has  pub 
licly  impugned  the  former.  Many  have  borne  their  testimony 
to  its  worth,  embracing  in  that  tribute  their  sense  of  his 
"  fiery  spirit "  as  one  of  its  prominent  attributes. 

Daniel  Webster  said  to  me,  upon  a  social  occasion,  "When 
a  life  of  your  grandfather  is  to  be  published,  I  should  like 
to  write  a  preface.  I  was  brought  up  with  New  England 
prejudices  against  him,  but  I  consider  him  as  second  only 
to  Washington  in  the  services  he  rendered  to  the  country 
in  the  war  of  the  Revolution.  His  zeal  and  devotion  to  the 
cause,  under  difficulties  which  would  have  paralyzed  the 
efforts  of  most  men,  and  his  fortitude  and  courage  when 
assailed  by  malicious  attacks  upon  his  public  and  private 
character,  every  one  of  which  was  proved  to  be  false,  have 
impressed  me  with  a  strong  desire  to  express  publicly  my 
sense  of  his  great  qualities." 

Chief  Justice  Kent,  writing  of  General  Schuyler,  says: 
"  In  acuteness  of  intellect,  profound  thought,  indefatigable 
activity,  exhaustless  energy,  pure  patriotism,  and  persevering 
and  intrepid  public  efforts,  he  had  no  superior." 


26 


The  campaigns  of  1775  and  1777  are  treated  by  Washing 
ton  Irving  much  more  in  detail  than  they  are  by  you.  You 
are  well  aware  how  differently  he  judges  of  the  public  serv 
ices  of  General  Schuyler  from  yourself;  and  surely  no  one 
could  have  a  quicker  or  more  refined  perception  than  Mr. 
Irving  of  all  that  was  noble  or  contemptible  in  any  man's 
private  character.  His  pages  beam  throughout  with  warm 
expressions  of  his  high  esteem  for  General  Schuyler  as  a 
soldier  and  a  man.  I  may  also  say  that  Mr.  Irving  frequently 
expressed  to  me  in  conversation  his  appreciation  of  General 
Schuyler  in  terms  almost  identical  with  those  used  by  Mr. 
Webster. 

General  Schuyler  lived  twenty  years  after  the  war,  quite 
long  enough  for  all  matters  of  a  personal  character  to  be 
scrutinized  and  determined.  He  took  an  active  part  in  poli 
tics;  and  at  no  period  of  our  country's  history  were  rival 
partisans  more  bitter  and  personal.  Yet  no  one  ever  brought 
up,  in  the  excitement  of  party  strife,  these  rumors  against 
his  reputation,  started  during  the  war.  They  were  deemed 
so  idle,  and  were  considered  so  amply  refuted,  as  to  have  no 
longer  a  place  in  men's  minds  or  memories. 

With  all  the  companions  of  his  military  life — with  Wash 
ington,  Lafayette,  and  other  surviving  leaders,  as  well  as  with 
those  who 'served  under  him,  or  were  a  part  of  his  military 
family,  to  whom  his  personal  military  character  was 
thoroughly  known,  he  ever  preserved  the  most  intimate 
personal  relations — relations  wholly  incompatible  with  any 
suspicion  on  their  part  that  he  had  ever  been  deficient  in 
personal  courage.  As  he  advanced  in  years,  that  respect  for 
his  personal  character  appears  to  have  increased.  He  was 
the  friend  and  adviser  of  Hamilton,  and  though  a  bitter 
political  opponent  of  Jefferson,  the  latter  was  a  visitor  at  his 
house,  and  consulted  with  him  upon  questions  of  finance. 
He  died  with  the  conviction,  shared  until  now  by  his  family 


27 


and  friends,  that  whatever  estimate  the  future  historian 
might  place  upon  his  capacity  as  a  public  servant,  his  private 
character  was  beyond  the  reach  of  cavil  or  of  blame. 

I  do  not  think,  as  against  this  general  record  of  his  life, 
the  grounds  you  rely  upon  for  an  opposite  conclusion  are 
sound.  I  feel  justified  in  asking  you  to  reconsider  your 
opinion  ;  and  should  you  find  occasion  to  change  it,  so  far  as 
to  admit  that  the  charge  of  "  suspicion  of  want  of  personal 
courage"  had  no  more  ground  for  belief  than  those  other 
charges  which  were  publicly  inquired  into  and  refuted,  that 
you  will,  in  justice  to  General  Schuyler's  memory,  publish  a 
note  to  that  effect  in  the  preface  to  your  next  forthcoming 

volume. 

Respectfully  yours,  &c., 

GEORGE   L.   SCHUYLER. 
HON.  GEORGE  BANCROFT, 

21st  Street,  New  York. 


NEW  YORK,  Feb.  4th,  1867. 
DEAR  SIR: 

Excuse  me  for  reminding  you  that  my  communication  of 
January  16th  ended  with  a  request. 

May  I  ask  you,  at  your  earliest  convenience,  to  inform  me 
of  your  decision  in  regard  to  it. 

Respectfully  yours,  &c., 

GEORGE  L.  SCHUYLER. 
HON.  GEORGE  BANCROFT, 

17  West  21st  Street,  New  York. 


NEW  YORK,  February  5th,  1867. 
DEAR  SIR  : 

If  your  views  of  the  duty  of  a  historian  coincide  in  any 
degree  with  mine,  you  will  on  second  thought  agree  with  me 

4 


28 


that  he  ought  never  to  settle  in  advance  with  the  represent 
ative  of  a  family  the  terms  in  which  he  should  speak  of  any 
member  of  that  family  who  has  played  a  public  part.  My 
next  volume  will  make  honorable  mention  of  the  public 
services  of  General  Schuyler ;  but  what  I  shall  say  of  him  I 
cannot  communicate  to  you  now.  This  is  so  obviously  the 
dictate  of  propriety,  that  it  must  meet  your  approval. 

In  reference  to  any  reasonings  or  documents  which  you 
may  communicate  to  me,  they  will  receive  my  most  respect 
ful  and  impartial  consideration. 

As  to  the  special  point  on  which  you  have  written  to  me, 
we  are  not  so  far  apart  as  some  phrases  in  your  letter  would 
seem  to  imply.  We  are  agreed  that  General  Schuyler  was 
removed  from  the  Northern  command  at  the  end  of  the  sum 
mer  of  1777,  by  an  almost  unanimous  vote  of  the  States  in 
Congress,  notwithstanding  that  New  York  had  at  that  time 
in  its  delegation  friends  of  Schuyler  thoroughly  skilled  in 
parliamentary  tactics.  We  are  also  agreed  that  the  change 
of  command  was  founded,  not  on  the  odium  which  attended 
the  losing  of  Ticonderoga,  but  merely  on  the  representation 
of  the  Eastern  States  that  their  militia,  suspicious  of  his 
military  character,  would  not  turn  out  in  defence  of  New 
York  while  he  presided  in  the  Northern  Department.  But 
whether  the  men  thus  suspicious,  in  Congress  or  out  of 
Congress,  were  in  the  right,  or  were  simply  mistaken,  or 
were  such  as  deserve  to  be  called  by  so  harsh  an  epithet  as 
scoundrels,  is  a  point  on  which  I  have  expressed  no  opinion ; 
and  where  I  refer  in  words  of  my  own  to  the  antipathy  which 
existed  between  Schuyler  and  the  New  England  troops,  I  call 
it,  in  words  carefully  chosen,  "  a  not  wholly  unreasonable 
aversion"  on  their  part.  Nay,  more,  though  I  believe  Schuy 
ler  himself,  at  a  later  day,  declared  Congress  to  have  acted 
wisely  in  superseding  him,  I  have  nowhere  said  so;  but 
have  simply  narrated  the  events  as  they  happened. 


29 


I  sometimes  think  you  have  never  read  my  volume.  High 
praise  is  awarded  to  Schuyler  as  an  officer  and  as  a  man. 
On  page  200,  for  example,  I  speak  of  him  as  a  military  com 
mander  ever  on  the  alert,  and  doing  the  right  thing,  and  a 
most  important  thing,  at  the  right  moment,  and  from  his 
own  impulse,  leaving  the  reader  to  contrast  his  conduct  with 
that  of  Gates  under  similar  circumstances.  And  again,  on  page 
338,  he  is  described  as  one  who  loved  his  country  more  than 
rank  or  fortune. 

Yours  respectfully, 

GEO.  BANCROFT. 


NEW  YOKK,  Feb.  9th,  1867. 
DEAR  SIR  : 

Your  note  of  the  5th  instant  is  received.  As  connected 
with  the  special  point  on  which  I  have  written  to  you,  namely, 
General  Schuyler's  want  of  personal  courage,  you  introduce 
as  new  matter  the  circumstances  connected  with  his  removal 
from  the  command  of  the  Northern  Army,  upon  which  you 
say  that  we  agree.  There  are,  however,  several  statements  to 
which  I  do  not  agree.  I  refer  to  them  in  their  order : 

Whether  the  vote  for  the  removal  of  General  Schuyler 
(August  1st,  1777)  was  nearly  unanimous  or  not,  I  have  no 
means  of  ascertaining.  The  "  yeas  and  nays"  for  any  resolu 
tion  in  Congress  were  called,  for  the  first  time  in  its  history, 
on  the  8th  of  August,  one  week  later.  The  resolution,  as  it 
appears  upon  the  journal,  reads  as  follows:  Resolved,  That 
Major-General  Schuyler  be  directed  to  repair  to  head-quarters. 
That  General  Washington  be  directed  to  order  such  General 
Officer  as  he  shall  think  proper,  to  repair  immediately  to  the 
Northern  Department  to  relieve  Major-General  Schuyler  in 
his  command  there. 


30 


General  Washington  declined  taking  any  part  in  this  busi 
ness. 

In  a  letter  to  Congress  (August  3d)  "  he  desires  to  be  excused 
from  making  any  appointment  to  the  command  of  the  North 
ern  Army." 

It  was  upon  the  receipt  of  this  letter  that  General  Gates 
(as  stated  in  your  last  volume)  was  appointed,  by  the  vote  of 
eleven  states. 

That  the  adherents  of  General  Gates,  in  and  out  of  Con 
gress,  made  large  use  of  "  the  want  of  confidence  of  the  militia 
of  the  Eastern  States  in  General  Schuyler's  military  char 
acter,"  is  certainly  true ;  but  that  such  want  of  confidence  was 
in  any  way  connected  with  suspicions  of  his  lack  of  personal 
courage  remains  to  be  shown.  I  find  no  evidence  of  it  in  any 
quarter  entitled  to  consideration. 

You  are,  I  think,  mistaken  in  assuming  that  General 
Schuyler's  harsh  epithet  of  "  Scoundrels"  was  applied  to  any 
persons,  in  or  out  of  Congress,  who  openly  criticised  his  mili 
tary  character.  The  letter  of  Mr.  Duer,  in  answer  to  which 
he  uses  that  expression,  refers  to  the  hints  and  sneers  of  mali 
cious  individuals — not  to  any  outspoken,  manly  attacks ;  and 
to  such  persons  the  epithet  justly  applies. 

I  was  not  aware  that  General  Schuyler,  at  a  later  day,  de 
clared  Congress  to  have  acted  wisely  in  superseding  him  ;  but 
if  so,  he  certainly  did  not  thereby  indorse  the  idea  that  his 
want  of  personal  courage  was  questioned,  by  his  removal. 

Upon  the  petition  of  six  General  Officers  of  the  Northern 
Army,  Congress  requested  him  to  remain  with  them,  after 
being  deprived  of  his  command.  He  did  remain,  even  under 
such  trying  circumstances,  and  was  present  when  Burgoyne 
laid  down  his  arms  on  his  own  grounds,  amid  the  smouldering 
ruins  of  his  home,  which  the  latter  had  so  wantonly  destroyed. 

If  the  action  of  Congress  in  removing  General  Schuyler 
from  his  command  can  be  brought  forward  as  bearing  upon 


31 


his  personal  character,  the  subsequent  action  of  the  same 
body  upon  the  subject  of  his  resignation,  should  be  entitled  to 
some  weight  in  arriving  at  a  conclusion. 

On  the  5th  of  March,  1779,  more  than  eighteen  months  after 
his  removal  from  an  active  command,  General  Schuyler  sent 
in  his  resignation  to  Congress.  On  the  8th  of  March  it  was 
moved  that  it  be  accepted.  To  this  an  amendment  was  offered 
in  the  following  words:  "Resolved,  That  the  President  be 
directed  to  inform  General  Schuyler  that  Congress  are  very 
desirous  of  retaining  him  in  the  service,  especially  in  the 
present  situation  of  affairs ;  but  if  the  state  of  his  health  is 
such  as  that  he  judges  it  absolutely  necessary  to  retire,  Con 
gress,  though  reluctantly,  will  acquiesce  and  admit  his  resig 
nation." 

This  amendment  was  rejected  by  a  vote  of  eleven  out  of  the 
twelve  states  represented,  to  give  place  to  the  following  reso 
lution,  which  was  carried  (against  the  votes  of  New  England 
and  Pennsylvania) :  "  Resolved,  That  the  President  be  directed 
to  acquaint  Major-General  Schuyler  that  the  situation  of  the 
army  renders  it  inconvenient  to  accept  his  resignation,  and 
therefore  Congress  cannot  comply  with  his  request" 

Would  it  have  been  possible  to  pass  such  a  resolution  were 
there  even  a  suspicion  of  General  Schuyler's  want  of  personal 
courage  ? 

A  part  of  this,  however,  seems  foreign  to  the  subject  of  this 
correspondence ;  and  referring  back  to  the  commencement  of 
your  note,  I  see  that  I  have  failed  to  explain,  with  sufficient 
clearness,  my  position  in  addressing  you. 

I  have  no  desire  to  settle  in  advance  the  terms  upon  which, 
as  an  historian,  you  should  speak  of  General  Schuyler  in  your 
forthcoming  volume ;  nor  do  I  conceive  myself  entitled  to 
question  you  personally  (except  to  ask  for  authorities)  upon 
what  you  have  already  said  about  his  public  services.  For 
this  you  are  open  to  criticism  through  the  usual  channels,  and 


32 


this  much  I  expressed  in  my  first  note,  asking  you  for  the 
grounds  upon  which  you  speak  of  General  Schuyler  "as  a  man 
wanting  in  personal  courage." 

Such  a  charge,  you  are  well  aware,  is  a  criminal  charge — as 
against  a  soldier — more  disgraceful  to  him  in  the  world's  esti 
mation,  than  any  other  that  can  be  brought  forward,  however 
base  or  contemptible.  Upon  conviction,  the  rules  of  war 
punish  it  with  death ;  and  society  enshrouds  its  victim  with  a 
pall  of  obloquy  which  never  can  be  raised.  A  charge  made 
in  this  careful  and  deliberate  manner  during  General  Schuy- 
ler's  lifetime  must  irretrievably  have  destroyed,  publicly  and 
socially,  either  him  or  the  person  who  made  it — the  one  if  the 
position  was  made  good — the  other  if  he  failed  in  the  proof. 

Whatever  my  personal  feelings  may  be,  I  have  endeavored 
to  keep  them  out  of  sight,  in  this  correspondence.  I  have 
assumed  that  in  your  desire  to  delineate  the  noble  traits  of 
Washington's  character,  and  especially  his  watchful  supervision 
of  the  interests  of  the  whole  country,  you  have  been  induced, 
if  not  to  speak  more  disparagingly  of  others  than  they  deserve, 
at  least  to  use  language  that  grates  more  harshly  on  the  ear 
than  you  really  intended. 

The  same  cause  has  doubtless  had  its  effect  upon  some  of 
your  general  statements.  I  will  cite  two  instances :  Page  373 
you  say  of  General  Schuyler,  "His  friends  urged  him  to 
silence  the  growing  suspicion  of  his  cowardice ;  he  answered, 
'If  there  is  a  battle  I  shall  certainly  expose  myself  more  than 
is  prudent.'  "  His  answer  to  those  insinuations  has  been 
already  given  in  the  extract  of  his  letter  to  Mr.  Duer.  The 
words  you  quote  as  his  reply  appear  to  be  made  up  from 
portions  of  his  letter  to  Mr.  Jay  upon  a  very  different  occasion, 
and  not  in  reply  to  any  communication. 

On  the  next  page  you  say :  "  Alarmed  by  Schuyler's  want 
of  fortitude,  he  (Washington)  ordered  to  the  North,  Arnold, 
who  was  fearless,"  etc. 


33 


It  seems  hardly  necessary  to  place  that  construction  upon 
an  order  of  General  Washington,  arising  from  a  request  of 
General  Schuyler  to  send  him  an  active  and  spirited  officer  to 
drill  his  raw  militia. 

For  these  reasons,  and  because  the  papers  you  have  sent 
me,  as  well  as  the  allusions  in  your  last  note  to  the  action  of 
Congress,  do  not  seem  to  justify  the  conclusions  you  have 
drawn,  I  had  hoped — and  still  hope — that  you  may  be  dis 
posed  to  reconsider  them ;  and  if  favorably,  I  have  supposed 
that  you  would  prefer  yourself  to  apply  the  remedy. 

The  method  I  have  suggested  relieves  me  also  from  the 
necessity  of  any  public  notice  of  your  statement,  which  I 
greatly  desire  to  avoid.  It  does  not  apply,  as  you  seem  to 
think,  to  what  is  to  be,  but  to  what  has  been  written  in  your 
history.  I  cannot  see  how  it  in  the  least  impinges  upon  your 
dignity  as  an  author  or  a  historian,  to  inform  me  definitely  of 
your  intentions  in  regard  to  it ;  or  to  say,  as  I  must  again 
respectfully  ask  of  you  to  do,  whether  you  are  willing  to  take 
any  action  in  the  matter  at  all,  in  this  or  any  other  way. 

Respectfully  yours,  etc., 

GEORGE  L.  SCHUYLER. 

On  the  15th  of  April  I  addressed  the  following  note 
to  Mr.  Bancroft : 

NEW  YORK,  April  15th,  1867. 

HON.  GEORGE  BANCROFT, 

SIR  :  Much  time  has  elapsed  since  my  last  communication,  in  which  I 
ask  whether  you  intend  to  take  any  action  upon  the  subject  of  our  corre 
spondence. 

By  your  silence  I  can  only  infer  that  I  have  failed  to  convince  you  that 
you  are  called  upon  to  do  so.  I  have  no  alternative  but  to  deny  publicly 
the  correctness  of  your  account  of  General  Schuyler's  character  for  courage, 
which  I  can  view  in  no  other  light  than  a  gratuitous  insult. 

I  shall,  unless  you  object,  make  use  of  this  correspondence — partly 


because  it  covers  so  much  of  the  matter  at  issue,  and  also  as  showing  that, 
in  the  first  place,  I  sought  redress  from  you  privately,  by  a  personal  appeal 
to  your  sense  of  justice. 

I  am,  Sir,  your  obedient  servant, 

GEORGE  L.  SCHUYLER. 

To  which  I  received  the  following  reply  : 

NEW  YORK,  April  15th,  1867. 

SIR  :  Your  letter  of  this  day  is  received.  It  remains  my  unalterable 
purpose  to  use  any  document  or  argument  which  you  may  present  with 
perfect  impartiality,  and  also  not  to  communicate  to  you  in  advance — least 
of  all  under  a  menace — what  I  may  have  to  say  of  your  ancestor  in  my 
next  volume. 

With  the  letters  you  have  addressed  to  me  you  must  do  what  you  please; 
but  they  neither  present  my  statements  fairly,  nor  refute  them,  and  so  far 
as  General  Schuyler  is  concerned,  they  neither  offer  the  best  excuse  for 
his  failures — for  he,  like  other  men,  had  failures — nor  do  they  present  the 
strongest  testimonies  of  the  general  esteem  in  which  his  virtues  as  a 
civilian  and  a  citizen  were  held. 

The  tone  of  your  note  to-day  shows  conclusively  how  proper  it  was  for 
me  to  decline  entering  into  a  correspondence  with  you,  on  a  subject  which 
you  can  hardly  be  expected  to  consider  with  the  critical  calmness  of  a 
disinterested  inquirer. 

I  remain  yours, 

GEORGE  BANCROFT. 


I  have  published  all  the  communications  which  have 
taken  place  between  us,  to  show  that,  in  the  first  place, 
I  asked  for  nothing  but  the  grounds  upon  which  Mr. 
Bancroft  made  one  particular  charge  against  General 
Schuyler  ;  and  also  that  I  confined  my  remarks  in 
writing  to  him,  as  far  as  possible,  to  that  one  point. 
At  the  close  of  my  letter  of  February  9th,  I  distinctly 


35 

state  that  what  I  ask  of  him  refers  to  what  has  been, 
and  not  to  what  is  to  be,  written. 

In  my  note  of  April  15th,  written  to  know  whether 
he  objects  to  my  publishing  the  correspondence  between 
us,  there  is  no  menace.  It  merely  refers  to  the  alterna 
tive  I  had  already  announced  as  incumbent  upon  me, 
if  no  action  were  taken  by  him. 

That  my  communications  to  Mr.  Bancroft  are  far 
from  being  what  I  should  like  them  to  be,  I  am  well 
aware.  I  have  neither  the  ability,  the  knowledge,  nor 
the  facility  in  writing  which  would  enable  me  to  cope 
with  him,  had  I  attempted  to  enter  the  field  of  history 
in  my  wish  to  excuse  General  Schuyler's  failures.  But 
I  have  attempted  nothing  of  the  kind.  In  endeavoring 
to  defend  his  memory  against  the  one  charge  of 
cowardice,  I  certainly  have  not,  as  Mr.  Bancroft  truly, 
though  ironically,  says,  "  brought  forward  the  strongest 
testimonies  of  the  general  esteem  in  which  his  virtues 
as  a  civilian  and  a  citizen  were  held ;"  but  it  would  not 
be  a  very  difficult  task  to  do  so,  if  it  had  any  special 
bearing  upon  the  subject  at  issue  between  us. 

Some  other  qualities  besides  learning  and  diligence 
are  essential  to  complete  the  character  of  a  successful 
historian.  When  his  materials  are  collected  and  his 

intellect  has  been  brought  to  bear  upon  them,  unless 

5 


36 

treated  with  candor,  fairness  and  truth,  his  labor  will 
be  in  vain.  He  should  have  some  qualities  of  heart, 
as  well  as  of  the  head.  He  should,  at  least,  be  capable 
of  comprehending  the  feelings  and  motives  of  men 
greater  than  himself — of  distinguishing  the  true  from 
the  false,  and  of  having  some  sympathy  for  generous 
and  unselfish  natures.  He  must  have,  at  all  events, 
sufficient  sense  of  honor  to  save  him  from  the  tempta 
tion  of  advocating  his  favorite  theories  in  violation  of 
the  spirit,  if  not  the  letter,  of  truth. 

Such  are  the  attributes  of  Marshall,  Prescott,  Wash 
ington  Irving,  Motley,  and  other  American  writers, 
whose  opinions  carry  conviction  from  the  elevated 
characters  of  the  men  who  advance  them. 

It  remains  to  be  seen  what  place  will  be  accorded  to 
Mr.  Bancroft,  when  his  work  is  completed,  upon  this 
roll  of  honored  names. 

In  the  few  pages  which  Mr.  Bancroft  has  devoted  to 
a  criticism  of  the  Campaign  of  1777  and  the  character 
of  General  Schuyler,  he  has,  in  my  judgment,  given 
false  impressions  to  the  future  student  of  history,  by 
omission  of  what  is  important  to  know,  and  by  an 
unfair  application  of  historical  facts. 

While  expatiating  largely,  elsewhere,  upon  the  ineffi 
ciency  of  Congress,  and  its  positive  inability  to  furnish 


37 

men,  money,  provisions,  and  military  stores  to  General 
Washington's  army,  the  reader  might  suppose  that 
General  Schuyler  labored  under  no  such  difficulties. 
Gordon  says  :  ' '  On  the  day  of  the  engagement  at  Hub- 
bardton  (July,  7th)  General  Schuyler  was  obliged  to 
strip  the  men  at  Fort  Edward,  to  send  to  the  troops  at 
Fort  Anne,  by  which  his  own  men  were  left  without 
lead  for  some  days,  except  a  mere  trifle  from  Albany, 
obtained  by  stripping  the  windows.  At  this  period  he 
had  not  above  700  Continentals  and  not  above  twice 
that  number  of  militia,  and  could  not  furnish  small 
cannon  sufficient  for  a  couple  of  little  schooners  on 
Lake  George." 

No  mention  is  made  of  his  great  and  successful  exer 
tions  in  obtaining  supplies,  or  of  his  prompt  action  in 
retarding  the  progress  of  Burgoyne  after  the  evacuation 
of  Ticonderoga  by  General  St.  Clair — the  main  cause 
of  the  success  of  a  campaign  which,  for  the  importance 
of  its  results,  has  been  ranked  among  the  seven  great 
battles  of  the  world. 

His  firmness  in  detailing  from  his  small  force  a  strong 
party  for  the  relief  of  Fort  Stanwix,  contrary  to  the 
decision  of  a  council  of  officers,  and  with  a  new  cry  of 
treason  raised  against  him  for  so  doing,  is  not  alluded  to. 

His  proposal  to  General  Washington  that  Southern 


38 

troops  should  be  used  at  the  North  for  the  purpose  of 
promoting  a  national  instead  of  a  sectional  spirit  in 
the  army,  is  represented  as  arising  from  a  mean  and 
commonplace  hatred  of  New  England  men,  without 
any  reference  to  the  principal  cause  of  the  difficulty, 
which  arose  from  the  unsettled  relations  of  the  States 
to  the  National  Congress  ;  from  the  unwillingness  of 
the  soldiers  to  be  commanded  by  any  but  officers  from 
their  own  States,  and  to  the  impatience  of  the  militia, 
who,  when  called  into  service,  found  themselves  com 
pelled  to  submit  to  the  discipline  of  an  army — to  work 
as  well  as  to  fight.  -i 

Nowhere  is  justice  more  freely  rendered  to  General 
Schuyler  in  regard  to  sectional  difficulties,  misappre 
hended  at  the  time,  than  at  this  day  in  the  New 
England  States  ;  and  from  no  other  quarter  have  I 
received  such  severe  comments  upon  Mr.  Bancroft's 
estimate  of  General  Schuyler's  character. 

While  exposing,  elsewhere,  the  conduct  of  General 
Charles  Lee,  of  Gates,  and  others,  toward  Washington, 
who,  as  Mr.  Bancroft  says,  "  was  surrounded  by  officers 
willing  to  fill  the  ears  of  members  of  Congress  with 
clamor  against  his  management,"  no  reference  is  made 
to  General  Schuyler's  hearty  and  cheerful  co-operation 


39 

and  compliance  with  every  suggestion  from  the  Com- 
mander-in- Chief. 

He  has  no  word  for  General  Schuyler's  devotion  to 
his  country  when,  deprived  of  his  command  in  the 
moment  of  victory,  he  continued  to  serve  under  his 
successor,  who  reaped  before  his  eyes  the  laurels  which 
had  been  destined  for  him. 

"  Though  sensible,"  he  says  in  his  letter  to  Congress, 
' '  of  the  indignity  of  being  ordered  from  the  command  of 
the  army  at  the  time  when  an  engagement  must  soon 
take  place,"  yet  at  the  same  time  he  writes  to  General 
Washington,  "I  shall  go  on  in  doing  my  duty  and 
endeavoring  to  deserve  your  esteem.'7 

In  the  Capitol  of  the  Nation,  at  Washington,  is  a 
picture  by  Trumbull  of  the  surrender  of  Burgoyne, 
of  interest  as  preserving  the  likenesses  of  those  who 
were  present  at  the  scene.  In  this  numerous  assemblage 
of  soldiers,  but  one  figure  is  represented  in  citizen's 
dress.  It  is  that  of  General  Schuyler,  to  whom  the 
sympathetic  nature  of  an  artist  thus  pays  a  passing 
tribute. 

These  omissions,  or  s*ome  of  them,  tend  to  obscure 
the  true  position  of  the  parties  concerned  in  the  Cam 
paign  of  1777.  There  are,  at  the  same  time,  statements 
which  give  impressions'  not  warranted  by  the  facts. 


40 

In  answer  to  a  remark  like  this:  "Meantime  the 
British  were  never  harried  by  the  troops  with  Schuyler, '' 
premising  that  Mr.  Bancroft  himself  gives  the  numbers 
under  Burgoyne  as  "  7500  choice  men,  exclusive  of 
Indians,  with  the  most  complete  supply  of  artillery 
ever  furnished  to  an  army/'  it  is  worth  while  to  read 
the  army  roll  of  General  Schuyler  at  that  time,  twenty 
days  after  the  battle  of  Hubbardton,  previously  re 
ferred  to  : 

July  27th.     Continental  troops,  2700. 

MILITIA. 

STATE    OF    CONNECTICUT. 

One  major,  one  captain,  two  lieutenants,  two  ensigns, 
one  adjutant,  one  quartermaster,  six  sergeants,  one 
drummer,  six  sick,  three  rank  and  file — the  rest  deserted. 

STATE    OF    MASSACHUSETTS. 

Berkshire  County. — Somewhat  more  than  200  are 
left. 

Hampshire  County. — Colonel  Moseby's  regiment,  ten 
or  twelve  left. 

STATE    OF    NEW    YORK. 

County  of  Albany.— W5Q  left. 

This  being  his  force  on  the  27th,  on  or  about  the 
29th  of  July  General  Schuyler  thought  proper  to  fall 


41 

back  to  Saratoga,  which  Mr.  Bancroft  comments  upon 
as  follows : 

"The  courage  of  the  commander  being  gone,  his 
officers  and  his  army  became  spiritless,  and,  as  his  only 
resource,  he  solicited  aid  from  Washington  with  unrea 
soning  importunity  " 

Even  as  late  as  August  4th,  he  makes  the  following 
return  :  "  4000  Continental  troops — if  men,  one-third 
of  whom  are  negroes,  boys,  and  men  too  aged  for  field, 
or  indeed  any  other  service,  can  be  called  troops — and 
1500  militia." 

Mr.  Bancroft  quotes  portions  of  private  letters  which 
speak  despondingly  of  the  state  of  affairs,  as  a  proof 
that  the  writers  are  either  untrue  to  the  cause,  or  else 
that  they  betoken  cowardice. 

I  am  not  surprised  that  he  does  not  appreciate  the 
fact  that  some  men  can  look  their  position  in  the  face, 
even  in  the  direst  extremity,  without  flinching  from 
duty  ;  but  I  am  surprised  at  his  inconsistency  in  bring 
ing  forward  such  extracts  as  evidence  of  weakness  in 
Greene,  or  timidity  in  Schuyler,  when  he  makes  them, 
and  justly,  too,  the  ground  of  sympathy  for  others 
"Such  is  my  situation  (says  Washington,  privately), 
that  if  I  were  to  wish  the  bitterest  curse  to  an  enemy 
on  this  side  of  the  grave,  I  should  put  him  in  my  stead 


42 

with  my  feelings."  Again,  writing  to  Congress,  he  says  : 
' '  Give  me  leave  to  say  your  affairs  are  in  a  more  unprom 
ising  way  than  you'  seem  to  apprehend.  Your  army  is 
on  the  eve  of  dissolution," — and  more  to  the  same  effect. 

General  Montgomery,  whose  courage  and  patriotism 
are  fully  appreciated  by  a  grateful  country,  writes  to 
General  Schuyler  :  "  I  am  exceedingly  well  pleased  to 
see  Mr.  Wooster  here,  both  for  the  advantage  of  the 
service  and  upon  my  own  account,  for  I  most  earnestly 
request  to  be  suffered  to  retire  should  matters  stand  on 
such  ja  footing  this  winter  as  to  permit  me  to  go  off  with 
honor.  I  have  not  talents  or  temper  for  such  a  com 
mand.  I  am  under  the  disagreeable  necessity  of  acting 
eternally  out  of  character — to  wheedle,  flatter  and  lie. 
I  stand  in  a  constrained  attitude.  I  will  bear  with  it 
for  a  short  time,  but  I  cannot  support  it  long." 

Perhaps  some  future  Bancroft,  regardless  of  General 
Montgomery's  established  fame,  may  venture  to  speak 
of  him  as  "anxious,"  and  suspected  of  grave  moral 
delinquencies. 

But  I  refrain  from  further  criticism.  While  it  de 
volves  upon  me  to  defend  General  Schuyler's  personal 
character,  I  am  sensible  that  it  is  more  becoming  to 
leave  to  others,  not  of  his  family,  the  vindication  of  his 
public  career. 


It  may  be  said  that  the  omissions  of  which  I  com 
plain  are  of  details  not  entitled  to  a  place  in  so  general 
a  history  ;  but  it  is  because  Mr.  Bancroft  himself  has, 
for  no  very  obvious  reason,  even  if  it  were  true,  fast 
ened  upon  General  Schuyler  the  imputation  of  coward 
ice,  that  I  deem  it  unfair  to  withhold  what,  otherwise, 
he  would  not  be  called  upon  to  mention. 

"The  best  historians  of  later  times  have  been 
seduced  from  truth,  not  by  their  imagination,  but  by 
their  reason.  Unhappily,  they  have  fallen  into  the 
error  of  distorting  facts  to  suit  general  principles. 
They  arrive  at  a  theory  from  looking  at  some  of  the 
phenomena,  and  the  remaining  phenomena  they  strain 
or  curtail  to  suit  the  theory.  For  this  purpose,  it  is 
not  necessary  that  they  should  assert  what  is  absolutely 
false.  In  every  human  character  and  transaction  there 
is  a  mixture  of  good  and  evil ;  a  little  exaggeration,  a 
little  suppression,  a  judicious  use  of  epithets,  a  watchful 
and  searching  skepticism  with  respect  to  the  evidence 
on  one  side,  a  convenient  credulity  with  respect  to 
every  report  or  tradition  on  the  other,  may  easily  make 
a  saint  of  Laud  or  a  tyrant  of  Henry  the  Fourth." 

These  words  of  Macaulay  describe  a  method  of 
writing  history  which  seems  admirably  suited  to  Mr. 


44 

Bancroft's  temperament,  and  of  which  he  has  largely 
availed  himself. 

In  the  preface  to  this  volume,  Mr.  Bancroft  announces 
himself  "  as  alone  responsible  for  what  he  has  written." 
Whatever  significance  may,  at  one  time,  have  attached 
itself  to  this  expression,  I  consider  it  as  meaning,  in  his 
case,  that  his  character  as  a  gentleman,  and  his  general 
standing  with  the  community,  challenge  any  question 
as  to  the  purity  of  his  motives. 

Of  Mr.  Bancroft's  own  estimate  of  himself  in  these 
respects  we  have  some  evidence  in  the  poetical  effusion 
which  closes  his  letter  in  reply  to  Greene,  published  in 
the  last  number  of  the  North  American  Review  : 

"  Thou,  notwithstanding,  all  deceit  removed, 
See  the  whole  vision  he  made  manifest ; 
And  let  them  wince  who  have  their  withers  wrung. 
What,  though,  when  tasted  first,  thy  voice  shall  prove 
Unwelcome ;  on  digestion,  it  will  turn  * 

To  vital  nourishment." 

I  do  not  find,  however,  so  much  lofty  disinterestedness 
as  these  lines  would  imply,  is  conceded  to  him  by  others. 

In  his  political  career,  his  course  has  not  been  very 
generally  considered  the  result  of  pure  conviction 
through  principle,  nor  is  the  estimate  placed  upon  him 
by  those  who  have  known  him  the  longest  and  most 


45 

intimately,  such  as  would  warrant  that  assumption  of 
merit  which  he  evidently  thinks  his  due. 

If  I  may  be  permitted  to  define  the  much-abused 
term  of  "gentleman,"  as  describing  a  man  who,  while 
jealous  and  tenacious  of  his  own  dignity  and  personal 
rights,  is  equally  careful  and  tender  of  those  of  others, 
and  who,  under  no  circumstances,  can  be  tempted  to  the 
commission  of  a  mean  or  unworthy  action,  it  may  admit 
of  question  whether  Mr.  Bancroft's  character  will  bear 
the  test. 

When,  in  his  note  to  me  of  February  5th,  he  ex 
presses  surprise  at  my  feelings,  because  in  other  parts 
of  his  work  he  gives  praise  to  General  Schuyler,  it  is 
clear  that  he  cannot  appreciate  how  deeply  the  epithet 
of  cowardice  shocks  the  sensibilities  of  honorable  men. 

When  General  Washington,  in  his  memorial  to  Con 
gress,  expresses  a  strong  wish  that  the  appointment  of 
officers  should  be  given  to  "gentlemen,"  Mr.  Bancroft 
deems  it  necessary  to  devote  a  page  to  explain  away 
and  palliate  the  use  of  the  word.  He  speaks  of  General 
Schuyler s  "social  position,"  as  if  that  were  a  draw 
back  to  his  merit. 

By  these  poor  bids  for  popularity,  at  the  expense  of 
dignity,  he  shows  that  weakness  of  a  common  nature 
which  cannot  take  in  the  true  spirit  of  the  American 


46 

people,  who  then,  as  now,  cordially  recognize  the  supe 
rior  advantages  of  culture  and  refinement  in  those  who 
are  true  to  the  greater  responsibilities  and  the  broader 
duties  to  humanity  they  entail  upon  their  possessors. 

I  hope  I  shall  not  be  considered  as  transgressing  the 
bounds  of  propriety  in  making  these  remarks  in  a 
matter  which,  as  between  me,  the  representative  of 
General  Schuyler,  and  Mr.  Bancroft,  is  of  a  personal 
nature. 

In  my  correspondence  with  him  I  endeavored  to  keep 
in  the  background  my  own  outraged  feelings,  assum 
ing  that  if  I  could  convince  him  of  error,  he  would  be 
ready  to  acknowledge,  and  himself  to  remedy  it. 

Though  I  have  failed  in  this,  it  seems  to  me  that  the 
most  casual  reader  will  find  nothing  in  the  documents 
Mr.  Bancroft  has  submitted  to  me  which  justifies  what 
he  has  written. 

On  the  other  hand,  I  believe  that  those  who  are 
familiar  with  the  state  of  public  opinion  just  after  the 
evacuation  of  Ticonderoga,  arid  who  have  read  at  full 
length  those  letters  of  General  Schuyler's  friends,  writ 
ten  to  him  at  that  time,  (extracts  from  which  form  more 
than  half  of  Mr.  Bancroft's  authorities,)  will  be  at  a 
loss  to  conjecture  what  motive  has  induced  him  to 
venture  so  far  on  such  an  unstable  basis. 


47 

No  one  of  a  true  and  manly  spirit  would  charge 
another  with  cowardice,  unless  upon  incontestable  proof. 
Even  then  the  instincts  of  a  gentleman  would  make 
him  shrink  from  bringing  it  forward,  unless  compelled 
thereto  by  its  bearing  upon  others,  or  by  the  require 
ments  of  history.  This,  however,  Mr.  Bancroft  has  done, 
and  has  given  it  the  large  circulation  of  his  history. 

To  those  few  who  feel  sufficient  interest  in  the  per 
sonal  character  of  General  Schuyler  to  read  my  protest 
against  this  wanton  insult  to  his  memory,  I  deem  it  my 
duty  to  point  out,  to  this  extent,  the  relative  positions 
in  the  estimation  of  their  contemporaries,  of  the 
accuser  and  the  accused. 

The  complete  life  of  General  Schuyler  is  yet  to  be 
published.  In  the  meantime  I  look,  without  much 
apprehension,  upon  this  attempt  of  Mr.  Bancroft  to 
deprive  him  of  the  reputation  of  a  brave  and  unselfish 
patriot — a  reputation  hitherto  accorded  to  him  by  his 
countrymen,  based  upon  the  verdict  of  historians  whose 
names  are  honored  and  whose  works  are  destined  to 

live. 

GEORGE  L.  SCHUYLER, 

6  East  14th  street. 
NEW  YORK,  April  16th,  1867. 


RETU 


14  DAY  USE 

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